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The figure of the femme fatale is understood as inviting her own murder. Supposedly, the cause of the 
violence done by a man in thrall to her, she is in fact the primary victim of this violence. In the French 
confessional narrative, the woman is always somehow at fault for the protagonist’s failure, whether 
by loving him too little or too much; she dies and he lives to tell the tale, recounting it to another man 
who listens and absolves. Thus, the heroine both dies again and is revived, to be contained—in both 
senses—in the text. Fictions from three centuries—Prévost’s Manon Lescaut (1753), Mérimée’s Carmen 
(1845), and Gide’s L’Immoraliste (1902)—will be compared for their representation of literary femicide. 
Almost a century later, the changed ending of Fatal Attraction (directed by Lyne in 1987) demonstrates 
the public’s clamor for the killing of a supposedly dangerous woman. A final section compares the 
significance of Princess Diana with these fictional instances of femicide: How did our love for her 
bring on her violent death?
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seems to offer their narcissism (see: Dinnerstein 
1977), or for the righteous anger of “good” wom-
en against “bad”; but it is essentially a fantasy of 
self-justification for the male violence that murders 
on the grounds of “passion.” Moreover, this fan-
tasy may—perhaps must—coexist with the knowl-
edge that “she asked for it” or “I couldn’t help my-
self” are no longer acceptable defenses in Western 
criminal law. 
Methodology 
My critical position is interdisciplinary, based on 
a training in comparative literary studies, which 
now takes its methodological angle from liter-
ary-and-cultural studies (see: Segal and Koleva 2014 
and http://cleurope.eu/). I read mainly male-au-
thored fictions through feminist and psychoanalyti-
cal approaches, analyzing the unconscious fantasies 
that have shaped them. In the article referred to 
above, Weil (2016:6) argues that “the study of fem-
icide, whether perpetrated consciously as an act of 
will or unconsciously or irrationally, falls squarely 
within the realm of sociology.” In literary-and-cul-
tural studies, there is no dividing line between con-
scious and unconscious motivations: fantasy under-
lies any action and an act is always the realization 
of a fiction—though, once again, this in no way di-
minishes the materiality of the outcome in which 
one dies and one lives. In this essay, I aim to carry 
the image of the femme fatale through five iterations 
and show how variously, and at times counter-in-
tuitively, its mislocation of the motive of “passion” 
operates. Manon, Carmen, Marceline, Alex, and 
Diana are of course very different women and suf-
fer very different deaths; yet I hope to show that we 
can think about them all through the same analytic 
lens.
Odd bedfellows as they may seem, I would situate 
this essay in the context of two non-literary theo-
rists—Sigmund Freud and Michel de Certeau. From 
Freud, I take the fundamental assumption that ev-
erything is an utterance and no utterance is innocent; 
thus, the overt or conscious intention of an artifact, 
system, or action is never more than part—arguably 
the least interesting part—of the story. Everyday 
parapraxes are purposeful acts, and
I fail to see why the wisdom which is the precipitate 
of ordinary experience of life should be refused its 
place among the acquisitions of science. The essen-
tial character of scientific work derives not from its 
distinctive objects but from its stricter method of es-
tablishing facts and its search for far-reaching correla-
tions. [Freud 1999a:175-176]1
In a similar way, I suggest, there are no earmarked 
objects for literary readings, but one can read both 
texts and other things in a literary way. Freud’s 
(1999b:293) mode of interpretation—of dreams, 
jokes, slips, or the social imagination—works best 
by taking what he calls “an irregular path full of 
twists and turns…like the zig-zag of the solution of 
a knight’s-move problem.” Gradually, by this meth-
od, he undoes overdetermined knots of meaning, 
based on the inference that these knots must have 
been purposefully (unconsciously) knotted up in 
that way. Literary reading can make use of both his 
assumptions and his methods.
1 All translations from French and German are my own, and 
reference is provided to the original text.
The Femme Fatale: A Literary and Cultural Version of Femicide
Femicide is a widespread social phenomenon, but it is also a cultural fantasy; arguably, one 
cannot exist without the other. In a recent article in 
Current Sociology, Weil (2016:2) notes that recent fic-
tions lean on an increased sensitivity and knowl-
edge of femicide “which goes beyond our western 
familiarity with Othello and Carmen.” Yet that 
familiarity is still with us: one thing Othello and 
Carmen have in common—and share with the oth-
er instances discussed below—is a fantasy that lo-
cates what Othello terms “the cause” (Shakespeare 
1951:1149) in the woman who dies, rather than the 
man who kills her. This idea of a sexual danger em-
bodied in the femme fatale may, in some ways, appeal 
to women: either for the glorious empowerment it 
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About a hundred years later, Certeau offers a per-
fect example of how the ideas of literacy can be 
used on a variety of objects apparently unconnect-
ed with direct acts of reading. Thus, he refers to 
walkers “whose bodies follow the downstrokes and 
cross-strokes of an urban ‘text’ which they write but 
cannot read” (Certeau 1990:141). The walker makes 
shapes—but far above his or her puny movements, 
the tourist looking down from on high (Certeau 
was writing in 1980 from the 110th floor of the World 
Trade Center) possesses a New York that is a “city 
composed of paroxysmal places in monumental re-
liefs. In it the spectator can read a universe that is 
taking off into the air” (Certeau 1990:139). The walk-
er writes, the viewer from above reads; one traces 
and is traceable, Daedalus creating the labyrinth, 
while the other becomes “a voyeur” or more pre-
cisely “a god’s eye” (Certeau 1990:140). He concludes: 
“being nothing but this point of vision is the fiction 
of knowledge” (Certeau 1990:140). Thus, all knowl-
edge is fiction-making, and to know is to read.
The Femme Fatale 
This essay, then, is a literary-cultural tour of a num-
ber of instances exemplifying a concept of danger-
ous femininity that has been all too influential. My 
first two examples, Manon Lescaut and Carmen, are 
figures as well—perhaps better—known from opera 
and ballet as from their literary originals, and both 
sprang from a Romantic masculine fantasy of mur-
der that will never be his fault. My third textual ex-
ample hides its violence deeper under the supposed 
weakness of the benighted intellectual and his late 
discovery of the body that bleeds. My fourth exam-
ple illustrates how audiences refused to take the 
side of a femme fatale at the center of a 1980s film; 
and my last follows an adored figure from recent 
history who, in her life, embodied a popular fantasy 
in which, perhaps, a violent death was always pre-
saged. What all these figures have in common is the 
seductiveness—to both sexes?—of the fatal and fat-
ed woman whose death is the premise for a fantasy 
of desire.
The term femme fatale is familiar enough—a brief 
Internet search produces pages of sultry-eyed love-
lies from Garbo to Britney Spears, Lauren Bacall to 
Lolita. They gaze out of a frame both sideways and 
head-on. Of course, they may feed a narcissistic fan-
tasy in their female viewers, but, more particularly, 
they license violence to them, by suggesting that the 
motive has originated in them. Let me begin this 
tour with a female-authored text, which indirectly 
exposes the phenomenon at its root. It will not sur-
prise us to discover that the motive does not orig-
inate in the victim but in the resentment of a man 
who happens not to be loved.
The scene is from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1965). 
The monster is wandering in lonely despair, trying 
to find his way back to his creator and enemy, Victor 
Frankenstein. By chance, he meets Victor’s young 
brother William and, goaded by the child’s taunts, 
strangles him. Then he notices a miniature hanging 
round the boy’s neck. The portrait is of Victor and 
William’s mother. Her beauty moves him first to de-
sire, then to a correlative bitterness:
For a few moments I gazed with delight on her dark 
eyes, fringed by deep lashes, and her lovely lips; but 
presently my rage returned; I remembered that I was 
Naomi Segal
forever deprived of the delights that such beautiful 
creatures could bestow and that she whose resem-
blance I contemplated would, in regarding me, have 
changed that air of divine benignity to one expressive 
of disgust and affright. [Shelley 1965:136]
Enraged, he goes into a barn, where another woman 
lies asleep:
I bent over her and whispered, “Awake, fairest, thy 
lover is near—he who would give his life but to ob-
tain one look of affection from thine eyes; my beloved, 
awake!”
The sleeper stirred; a thrill of terror ran through me. 
Should she indeed awake, and see me, and curse me, 
and denounce the murderer? Thus would she assur-
edly act if her darkened eyes opened and she beheld 
me. The thought was madness; it stirred the fiend 
within me—not I, but she, shall suffer; the murder 
I have committed because I am forever robbed of all 
that she could give me, she shall atone. The crime had 
its source in her; be hers the punishment! [Shelley 
1965:137]
This young woman is Justine and hers is, indeed, 
the punishment: she is condemned to death for 
William’s murder, and Frankenstein, who realizes 
what must have happened, believes (rightly) that he 
is guilty of both deaths, both miscarriages of justice.
I want to examine the psychological mechanism 
revealed in this episode, the curse laid upon the 
blameless woman condemned for a crime she has 
not committed, but which a man has perpetrated 
because he believes she will not love him. She dies 
indirectly, but this is femicide nevertheless, in a me-
diate form. The key point is the line: “the murder 
I have committed because I am forever robbed of all 
that she could give me, she shall atone.” I shall ex-
plore three literary cases of this motive, and in all of 
them, directly or indirectly, the murder for which 
the guiltless woman is condemned is perpetrated 
against her.
The concept of the femme fatale is a Romantic one, 
born out of the hugely influential art movement of 
the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century. 
Some—for example, Goethe (in Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehrjahre 1795-1796) and Nietzsche (in Die Geburt 
der Tragödie 1872)—would argue that Romanticism 
began with the figure of Hamlet, for whom “con-
science does make cowards of us all” (Shakespeare 
1951:1047), on the grounds that a person, especially 
a young person, who thinks too much will never 
act. The feebleness of the Romantic hero is one rea-
son why the harm he does is re-read as sensitivity or 
susceptibility, not least to frustrated desire.
Little more than a century after Shakespeare, the 
Abbé Prévost created Des Grieux, the narrator-pro-
tagonist of Manon Lescaut, another brilliant young-
ster, who has—so we are told—wasted his life chas-
ing after a flighty minx unworthy of his abiding pas-
sion. Manon is the first of a series of “bad” women in 
French récits (see: Segal 1986; 1988) whom immature 
young men fall in love with and for whose sake—
again, so the text argues—they abandon promising 
careers in the church, army, or politics. This protag-
onist’s life is the subject of the story he tells to an 
older man who listens eagerly (as we do) and either 
sympathizes or condemns him—occasionally both. 
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The lost life at issue is that of the young man; yet, 
actually, he does not lose his life: the woman does. 
She dies and he tells the tale. She dies, I will argue, 
so that he can tell the tale. In other words, much of 
the most important modern literature is based on 
a case of femicide, and comes into being precisely 
on the grounds of that death.2 
According to Wikipedia,
A femme fatale is a stock character of a mysterious 
and seductive woman whose charms ensnare her lov-
ers, often leading them into compromising, danger-
ous, and deadly situations…Her ability to entrance 
and hypnotise her victim with a spell was in the 
earliest stories seen as being literally supernatural; 
hence, the femme fatale today is still often described 
as having a power akin to an enchantress, seductress, 
vampire, witch, or demon, having power over men. 
[Wikipedia Femme fatale]
In this “stock” view, the woman is dangerous, wily, 
deceitful—but what motivates her? It is meant to 
remain mysterious, no doubt, but mysterious for 
whose benefit?
In Mario Praz’s The Romantic Agony (1970), the pan-
oply of nasties, to cite his chapter headings—The 
beauty of the Medusa, The metamorphoses of Satan, 
La belle dame sans merci, Byzantium, Swinburne, 
and “le vice anglais”—stand in the shadow of the 
grand-daddy of them all, the marquis de Sade. His 
Justine is another innocent caught in the snare of 
2 The death of the beloved woman is similarly a universal 
premise of the novel of adultery, the key genre of European 
realism: see Segal 1992.
others’ wickedness. It is precisely her innocence 
that feeds a masculine fantasy of danger and vi-
olence.
Manon Lescaut (1753)
My first fiction is Manon Lescaut (1753). Like the 
other two literary fictions I shall discuss, it has 
a central first-person narrative in which a young 
man tells his story to a frame-narrator, who pres-
ents it. Des Grieux, a 17-year-old theology student, 
takes one look at a girl a few years older “and much 
more experienced” (Prévost 1995:20) than him, and 
abandons his studies, his religion, his friends, fam-
ily, and apparent principles, to follow her wherever 
she may go. First, they run off to Paris, “defrauding 
the rights of the church” (Prévost 1995:25), but with 
a vague intention of marrying, and when the mon-
ey runs out, without telling Des Grieux, Manon 
calls in his older brother to take him home to his 
father.
This is the first of a series of what Des Grieux will 
call “betrayals,” but it is possible to read Manon’s 
life-choices differently since, as often as she leaves 
him, she also comes back to him, and it is she, not 
he, who understands the practicalities of life. He 
is no more honest than she, and it is only ever he 
who breaks the law—he abducts her from prison, 
killing a guard, he makes money by card-sharping, 
and on more than one occasion he lies his way into 
the assistance of his devout but besotted friend, 
Tiberge. These criminal acts are all justified in his 
(and maybe our) eyes by being committed in the 
name of his one morality: keeping Manon by his 
side.
As for Manon, in a rare passage in direct voice (a let-
ter she leaves for him when joining another rich lov-
er), she justifies her actions thus:
I swear to you, my dear Chevalier, that you are the 
idol of my heart, and the only one in all the world that 
I could love as I love you; but don’t you see, my poor 
darling, that in the state we have been reduced to, fi-
delity is a silly virtue? Do you think one can be truly 
loving when one has nothing to eat? Hunger would 
cause me to make some fatal mistake: one day I would 
breathe out my last, thinking I was uttering a sigh of 
love. I adore you, believe me, but for a while you must 
leave the management of our affairs to me. Woe be-
tide whoever falls into my clutches! I am working to 
make my Chevalier rich and happy. My brother will 
let you know how your Manon is, and tell you how 
she wept at having to leave you. [Prévost 1995:68-69]
Whether or not we believe what Manon says here—
Des Grieux certainly does not, and his attachment 
grows ever more bitter, but nonetheless strong for 
that, maybe stronger—it can surely be understood 
as a different “economy” of love from his. For her, it 
seems, the co-presence of the body is less essential 
than what she later calls, in similar tones, “the fidel-
ity of the heart” (Prévost 1995:147).
What is the outcome? Manon is punished for what 
are largely Des Grieux’s crimes, on the grounds that 
if he—a talented young man of high birth—commit-
ted them for love of her, then that is clearly her fault. 
She is a classic femme fatale, in other words.
Manon is condemned to be deported to the new 
French colonies in America. Des Grieux refuses to 
let go and follows her there. Once again, this is per-
ceived as the most touching devotion, rather than 
as an addiction: he will support her in her exile. Yet 
this is not what happens. Once in New Orleans, they 
tell the colonial Governor they are married. All goes 
well for a while, even though the Governor’s neph-
ew, Synnelet, is in love with Manon. However, Des 
Grieux then decides he is ready to marry Manon for 
real and confesses the lie to the Governor who, nat-
urally, unimpressed by this belated honesty, prom-
ises Manon to Synnelet. Des Grieux kills his rival, 
he and Manon run away, and, once in the desert, 
an uncharacteristically feeble Manon does indeed 
breathe out her last.
This is how Des Grieux buries his beloved:
For more than twenty-four hours I remained pros-
trate, my mouth pressed to the face and hands of my 
dearest Manon. My intention was to die there, but at 
the beginning of the second day, I realized that this 
would leave her body exposed, after my death, to be-
ing devoured by wild beasts. So I resolved to bury her 
and wait for death on her grave…I broke my sword, 
to use it for digging, but my own hands were of more 
service. I dug a wide grave and there I laid the idol of 
my heart, after having wrapped her in all my clothes, 
so that the sand would not touch her. I did not place 
her there until I had kissed her again a thousand 
times, with all the ardor of the most perfect love. I sat 
down again close by her and gazed at her for a long 
time. I could not bring myself to close up the grave. At 
last, my strength beginning to fail, and fearful that it 
might run out altogether before I had completed my 
undertaking, I buried in the bosom of the earth the 
most perfect and beloved thing it ever bore. Then I lay 
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down on the grave, my face turned to the sand and, 
closing my eyes with the intention of never opening 
them again, I invoked the aid of Heaven and waited 
impatiently for death. [Prévost 1995:200]
So upset that he cannot speak, Des Grieux is almost 
a zombie; in other words, he borrows her state of 
death (for a time). Then, he is rescued by Tiberge and 
later by the frame-narrator, to whom he tells this af-
fecting story a few years later. In narrating to these 
men (and to us), Des Grieux absolves himself both 
of his crimes and perhaps of his love of Manon; he 
is exculpated and can return to respectable society. 
She, on the other hand, is exposed and effectively 
reinterred in his story. His version of their two mo-
tives is the only one that can, henceforth, be known.
Carmen (1845)
Something very similar happens to Carmen, 
the equally lively, wayward heroine of Prosper 
Mérimée’s (1980) novel. Like the frame-narra-
tor of Manon Lescaut, the frame-narrator of this 
short novel meets the protagonist twice, before 
and after the woman’s death, and also has a brief 
chance to meet Carmen. He is struck by her pow-
erful presence, big black eyes, and air of being 
“‘Moorish, or…’—I stopped, not daring to say 
‘a Jewess’” (Mérimée 1980:54). “She laughs: ‘Oh 
come! Can’t you see I’m a gypsy! Would you like 
me to tell your baji [fortune]? Have you ever heard 
of La Carmencita? That’s me!”’ (Mérimée 1980:54).
We next meet Don José when he is awaiting exe-
cution for having killed Carmen. He too tells the 
frame-narrator his life-story. Born in the Spanish 
Basque country, of highborn stock and a keen player 
of pelota, he kills an opponent and has to escape to 
the army. After a short time he is “led astray” by the 
brilliantly seductive Carmen, who persuades him to 
set her free after he has arrested her for attacking 
a fellow cigarette-girl; a skilled mimic, she tells him 
she is from his country, but
She was lying, monsieur, she did nothing but lie. I don’t 
know if that girl ever spoke a word of truth in her 
life; but when she spoke I believed her: I just couldn’t 
help it. She was mangling the Basque language, yet 
I believed she was from Navarra; her very eyes and 
mouth and coloring proved she was a gypsy. I was 
crazy, I didn’t know what I was doing…It was like be-
ing drunk. [Mérimée 1980:68]
So, we have here another addict whose attachment 
is based as much on hatred as anything we might 
call love; he calls it madness. He despises her for 
the very qualities—her independence, her skill with 
languages, her knowledge, and leadership—that 
he admires in her and knows are lacking in him. 
Carmen promises him love (as her minchorrò) and 
even a gypsy marriage (as her rom), but not for ever. 
Don José joins her bandit gang and takes active part 
under her command in what he calls their “ugly 
trade” (Mérimée 1980:96). But soon:
“Do you know,” she said, “since you’ve been my rom 
for real I don’t love you as much as when you were my 
minchorrò. I don’t want to be harassed and above all 
I don’t want anyone telling me what to do. I want to be 
free and do what I like. Beware of pushing me too far; 
if you get on my nerves I’ll find myself some nice lad 
who’ll do to you what you did to the One-Eyed Man” 
[her husband, whom Don José has killed]. [Mérimée 
1980:95]
Yet, despite this independence, Carmen is made (in 
supposedly traditional roma fashion) to foretell, and 
thus seemingly invite, her death at Don José’s hands. 
In response to his threats, she says: 
“I’ve always thought you would kill me. The very first 
time I saw you I had just met a priest at the door of my 
house. And tonight, as we were going out of Cordova, 
didn’t you see? A hare ran across the road between 
your horse’s feet. It is written.” [Mérimée 1980:99] 
Written is, of course, exactly what it is. And this is 
how she dies, and how Don José’s narrative ends. 
They ride together to “a lonely gorge” (Mérimée 
1980:102). The act of femicide is worth reading in 
detail.
“Is this the place?” she said. 
And with one spring she was on the ground. She took 
off her mantilla, threw it at her feet and stood motion-
less with her hand on her hip, gazing at me. 
“You want to kill me, I can see that,” she said. “It is 
written. But you won’t make me give in.” 
I said to her: “I beg you, be reasonable. Listen to me: 
the past is all forgotten. Yet you know it’s you who 
have ruined me: it’s for your sake that I became a rob-
ber and murderer. Carmen, my Carmen! Let me save 
you, and save myself with you.”
“José,” she answered, “you are asking the impossible. 
I don’t love you anymore; you still love me, and that’s 
why you want to kill me. I could go on lying to you, 
but I can’t be bothered. It’s all over between us. You 
are my rom, and you have the right to kill your romi, 
but Carmen will always be free. A calli she was born, 
and a calli she’ll die.” 
“You love Lucas [the toreador], then?” I asked. 
“Yes, I loved him—as I loved you—for a while—
less than I loved you, perhaps. But now I don’t love 
anything, and I hate myself for having loved you.” 
[Mérimée 1980:102]
Don José weeps and begs her to relent. She refuses 
to change her mind and throws away a ring he has 
given her. “I struck her twice. It was the One-Eyed 
Man’s knife, which I had taken because I had broken 
my own. She fell at the second blow without a cry. It’s 
as if I can still see her great black eye staring at me. 
Then it grew dim and closed.” [Mérimée 1980:102] 
Like Des Grieux, he cannot leave her:
For an hour or more I remained beside the corpse, 
exhausted. Then I remembered that Carmen had of-
ten told me she would like to lie buried in a wood. 
I dug a grave for her with my knife and laid her in 
it. I searched a long time for her ring, and found it 
at last. I put it in the grave beside her, together with 
a little cross. Perhaps I was wrong. Then I mounted 
my horse, galloped to Cordova, and went to the near-
est guardhouse, where I made myself known. I told 
them I had killed Carmen, but I would not say where 
her body was...Poor child! It’s the Calle who are to 
blame for having brought her up like that. [Mérimée 
1980:103]
With these words of self-exculpation, the internal 
narrative closes. Now, this famous death-scene is 
generally read as the proof of Carmen’s resistance, 
her refusal to let herself be loved, the explanation 
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for—indeed justification of—her murder. The last 
sentence above blames her roma inheritance (femmes 
fatales are of course often “dark ladies from the oth-
er side” and Carmen’s baleful dark eye repeatedly 
stands metonymically for her foreignness) for all 
that has happened. But, once again, we can see that 
the violence is entirely on the man’s side, though the 
narrative does everything possible to argue the re-
verse.
Before going on to my third text, I would like to 
gather together the main points that emerge from 
my first two, classic femme fatale texts. What do 
they have in common? Both the heroes, young men 
who tell their story to a willing male listener, have 
failed in life. Each passionately loves a woman who, 
seemingly, does not love him. Why does Manon 
die? Because Des Grieux insists on following her to 
America. Why does Carmen die? Because Don José 
will not let her go. Both men watch their beloved die 
and then bury her. After this, they remain semi-life-
less (prostrate, exhausted), as if imitating her state. 
Until they have told the story—disinterring and rein-
terring her in words—they are like zombies. Telling 
the story against her allows them to live again.
L’Immoraliste (1902)
My third text is André Gide’s (2009) L’Immoraliste 
(The Immoralist). On the surface, it looks quite dif-
ferent from the other two: the woman is far from 
a femme fatale. But, once again, she dies in a dra-
matic climax and a pool of blood, and, once again, 
it is a matter of misplaced desire and two wasted 
lives, of which only the woman’s is violently ended. 
The book opens, like the others, with a frame. The 
frame-narrator, with a small group of friends, has 
been summoned by Michel to a village in Algeria 
where he is stranded, lacking the strength to return 
to France. Michel tells his story, and this story ends 
with the death of his wife Marceline. 
Everything in L’Immoraliste—implicitly, but never 
explicitly—suggests that Michel is gay, as his author 
was; but he never acts upon his implied desires. 
When both the bright-eyed boys of Algeria and the 
charismatic Ménalque beckon him to other acts and 
other lives, he is fascinated, but never follows. One 
critic alone noticed this and wrote to Gide, just af-
ter publication: “the husband is a pathetic lunatic 
whose very vices are half-hearted, a sadist and ped-
erast in vain…Michel moves about in an unknown 
world without desires…Your hero has just one fault 
that makes him uncongenial to me: that is his to-
tal lack of immorality” (letter from Francis Jammes, 
June 1902 as cited in Gide 1958:1515). And yet, every 
review you will find of the book asserts, as the title 
implies, that Michel is a self-indulgent “immoralist.” 
As the Amazon blurb has it: “One of Gide’s best-
known works, The Immoralist, concerns the unhappy 
consequences of amoral hedonism, telling the sto-
ry of a man who travels through Europe and North 
Africa and attempts to transcend the limitations of 
conventional morality.” 
What creates the impression that Michel is radical, 
hedonistic, or immoral? Simply the fact that, every 
time he almost commits an act of betrayal, his wife 
bleeds—finally, to death. Blood is part of an implicit 
hydraulics of exchange in this novel. What one has 
(it seems), the other must lack. We have already seen 
this in the inability of both Manon and Des Grieux, 
Carmen and Don José, to be powerful or criminal at 
the same time. In L’Immoraliste, this works by a pro-
cess of draining. Familiarly, blood may be gendered 
“good”/masculine or “bad”/feminine but never both; 
and where it denotes illness it may flow from Michel 
or Marceline, but not both at once (for the metaphor-
ics of blood, see: Segal 1992). The Arab boys have 
bright, healthy blood: one cuts his thumb while 
carving wood and laughs in pleasure at the gash of 
red, but when Michel spits a “huge grotesque [af-
freux—this word recurs at key moments of bleed-
ing, as we shall see] clot of blood” (Gide 2009:607), it 
is the sign of the tuberculosis that almost kills him. 
Later, when his wife is pregnant, Michel arrives 
home from an evening visit to Ménalque, to find 
Marceline surrounded by bloody medical instru-
ments, having suffered a violent miscarriage.
Thus, after a few hours spent just talking with the 
potential corruptor, we find the signs of a temp-
tation Michel has neither admitted nor espoused 
etched on the body of his wife. The evidence of this 
weird bargain—that she must suffer both for his 
wish to betray her and for his failure to do so—has 
gone right back to the opening of their story, where 
the narrative set up a reciprocal exchange between 
them.
A studious boy brought up by his professor fa-
ther, Michel is married off at the latter’s deathbed; 
Marceline is someone he has known all his life and 
yet “I knew my wife very little” (Gide 2009:598). He 
discovers that he is rich and Marceline is poor, that 
he is delicate while she is healthy. These differences 
will be the coinage of their exchange as they, like 
stupidity, become something not to be shared, but 
to be shared out between men and women: “We be-
gan to talk. Her charming remarks delighted me. 
I had formed, as best I might, a few ideas about the 
silliness of women. Beside her, that evening, it was 
I who appeared to myself awkward and stupid” 
(Gide 2009:601).
Like the supposed hydraulic exchange of qualities, 
the plot of the book is highly symmetrical: after their 
honeymoon in North Africa, they travel through 
Italy to Normandy, then to Paris; and then take the 
same route in reverse—Paris, Normandy, Italy, and 
again North Africa—as, following her miscarriage, 
Marceline somehow contracts TB in her turn. The 
places that aided Michel’s recovery are deadly for 
her: she grows weak, making him feel strong. And, 
just like our other two heroes, Michel clings to the 
wife he apparently does not love, dragging her to 
the place of his desire. Why? Because without her 
decline he has no “evidence” of the proud immoral-
ist he now believes himself to be.
Both Ménalque and the Arab boys represent a kind of 
power and desire that Michel does not have. Earlier 
in the story, he watched, fascinated, as the boldest of 
the boys, Moktir, stole a pair of Marceline’s scissors. 
Now, back in Biskra, she is extremely unwell. He 
rediscovers Moktir—still gorgeous, though all the 
other boys have grown out of their attractiveness. 
The last night proceeds thus. After staying beside 
his wife till nightfall, weary of “the superhuman 
effort,” his eyes “drawn horribly [affreusement] to 
the black holes of her nostrils” (Gide 2009:687-88),3 
3 On the theme of the “black vortex,” see: Segal 1988: on Carmen, 
42-43 and 51; on Fromentin’s Dominique: 149, on L’Immoraliste: 
151, and on “Men’s mirror and women’s voice,” 202-223.
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Michel slips out and follows Moktir to a café where 
his mistress leads Michel to a low bed and at last: 
“I let myself go to her as one lets oneself sink into 
sleep…” (Gide 2009:688 [ellipses Gide’s]). Thus, pas-
sively, still not responsible for his acts, the protag-
onist commits a limited adultery—not with the de-
sired Moktir, but only with his mistress. 
Of course, he rushes home to find the room awash 
with blood and Marceline’s hideous eyes gazing 
at him in uncanny silence. He searches her face 
to find somewhere “to place a dreadful [affreux] 
kiss” (Gide 2009:689). She dies after losing her 
faith, dropping her rosary, and only hours lat-
er: “towards early morning, another vomiting of 
blood…” (Gide 2009:689 [ellipses Gide’s]). And that 
is the end of Marceline and, with her, of Michel’s 
narrative. However, before he finally stops speak-
ing, he makes two revealing remarks. First, famil-
iarly, he expresses his incapacity to act for himself 
following the death of the woman: “Take me away 
from here; I can’t do it by myself. Something in my 
will is broken” (Gide 2009:690).4 And then he utters 
the curious observation: “At times I am afraid that 
what I have suppressed will take revenge” (Gide 
2009:690).
What exactly has Michel (or indeed Gide) de-
stroyed or suppressed from the text that might 
take its revenge on them? The answer brings us 
back to my reading of the femme fatale and, indeed, 
our overall theme of femicide. If Marceline just 
goes inexorably downhill, dies a “natural death,” 
4 You do not have to be a vulgar Freudian to note the same ep-
ithet, “broken,” used of Des Grieux’s sword, Don José’s knife, 
and Michel’s will.
why is there so much blood? Because, essentially, 
she has been murdered by Michel’s failure to be 
three things: firstly, what he thinks he is—actively 
immoral; secondly, what he will not admit he is (or 
what the author chooses not to make him)—active-
ly homosexual; and finally, and most significantly 
here—dependent for his idea of freedom, indepen-
dence, desire, on the presence and destruction of 
the woman. 
Is this love? Is it desire? It is hard to say, in any of 
these cases. Des Grieux certainly appears to love 
Manon passionately. Don José, whether he loves 
her or not, desires Carmen beyond reason, and 
way beyond her wish. Michel seems to cling to 
Marceline, despite his failure to love or desire her. 
What these three young men have in common is 
that they cannot separate from their women and 
hound them to a femicidal death, which leads them 
through a temporary state of disempowerment to 
a new life as narrators, reinserted into the world of 
the patriarchy.
Fatal Attraction (1987)
I want to move sideways now to another fiction, the 
movie Fatal Attraction (directed by Adrian Lyne in 
1987),5 as popular as Manon Lescaut and Carmen in 
their day, and which gave English a new term for 
the femme fatale: “bunny-boiler.” However, it gener-
ally escapes the notice of viewers that Alex Forrest 
5 Quotations from Fatal Attraction are retrieved from the DVD of 
1987. Characters are listed by their first name, and other speak-
ers are abbreviated as follows: AA = Anne Archer; AL = Adrian 
Lyne (director); GC = Glenn Close; MD = Michael Douglas; NM 
= Nicholas Meyer (screenwriter); SL = Sherry Lansing (produc-
er); SJ = Stanley Jaffe (producer).
(Glenn Close) never attacks any human beings apart 
from herself. All the active violence in the film is 
perpetrated by the male protagonist, Dan Gallagher 
(Michael Douglas). Yet the film is addressed to, and 
focused upon, the experience of an adulterous man 
who, it is implied, gets out of his depth and deserves 
a second chance at a good marriage.
This balance of power is nowhere better exemplified 
than in the film’s closing scene. Dan has been al-
lowed home by his wife Beth (Anne Archer), bruised 
both emotionally by his betrayal and physically af-
ter she crashed the car, believing Alex was a danger 
to their daughter. Throughout the film a number of 
references to Madame Butterfly in the earlier lives of 
Alex and Dan have suggested the damage that un-
loving fathers may do their children, and of course 
the shock of women abandoned by men. This has 
offered viewers a way both to see the difference 
between Butterfly’s sublime (traditional, feminine) 
passivity and Alex’s (modern, unfeminine) refusal 
to “be ignored,” and to detect an undertow in which 
Butterfly’s agony and thus, implicitly, her trajectory 
is mirrored in Alex’s. 
The original ending—still featured in the DVD ex-
tras—was a suicide à la Madame Butterfly which, 
although the mechanics were crude, appeared to 
show an elegant Alex sitting cross-legged in a white 
dress cutting her throat. This scene is cited visually 
in the following exchange.
AL: The way the ending was originally in the screen-
play was that he got the blame…for something he 
didn’t do. She killed herself, she committed suicide, 
and that was the end of the movie.
SJ: When we shot the picture, we all liked the end-
ing—the original ending. 
NM: The ending I wrote for Fatal Attraction, the 
Madame Butterfly ending, was the ending that was 
filmed. 
SJ: It was intelligent, it was risky, and the way Adrian 
shot it was brilliant. But the audience was unsatisfied.
MD: What happened is nobody could anticipate the 
anger that the audience had for the character that 
Glenn portrayed so brilliantly.
SJ: We tested the picture in Seattle, in San Francisco 
and twice in Los Angeles, and you could have put 
a postage stamp over the reactions of the audience.
AA: As they began to test the movie, it became ap-
parent that audiences were really uncomfortable and 
unsatisfied.
SL: The audience was on the edge of their seat, and 
then you would come to a certain place, and you 
could just feel that they weren’t satisfied. 
AL: The ending just felt flat. It felt like the movie was 
working terrifically, you know, up until the last quar-
ter of an hour.
SJ: And in every one of the screenings, when Anne 
picks the phone up and says, “If you ever come near 
my family again, I’ll kill you, you understand?” the 
audience erupted. And you knew they wanted some... 
revenge. 
SL: By then we knew that the audience wanted Anne 
Archer to defend her family, we knew that they want-
ed Glenn Close to die, we knew all of these things...
Both the production team and, especially, Glenn 
Close preferred the original ending. As Close puts it: 
I thought it was a joke, when they came to me—when 
Stanley called me and said, “We’re going to reshoot 
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the ending.” Because for me, for all the research 
I’d done, that’s how that character would end and 
that’s how a lot of characters like that end: they’re 
self-destructive and they kill themselves, whereas 
the way the new ending portrayed her character was 
as “a one-note, sort of knife-wielding villain.” 
Finally, she was over-ridden and gave in.
AA: Adrian made no bones about it that the new end-
ing he wanted to use was in the style and the genre of 
the French film Diaboliques. 
AL: And listen, there’s probably many better end-
ings than we came up with, but this was an ending 
that was sort of operatic... [Special features: “Forever 
fatal”]
“Sort of operatic” is a fascinating conclusion. The 
ending which was finally chosen—surely more 
grand guignol than high art—is precisely the one 
that the Madame Butterfly thematic had not im-
plied. Even if far from high tech, the original 
ending was, as the make-up artist Richard Dean 
notes elsewhere in the features, both picturesque 
and beautiful; elegance and blood have now been 
replaced by a furious resurrection from an arti-
ficially deepened bath, and a “clean” shot from 
a righteous woman. This is the revenge of virtue 
against vice, as represented by the two tradition-
al female types, virgin and whore, maman and 
putain, fairy godmother and wicked stepmother. 
What was brought together in sublime tart-with-
a-heart, Cio Cio San, and remains potential in 
transgressive Alex, falls apart again in the violence 
of woman against woman that was the preferred 
ending.
Although it is Beth who kills Alex, that is only after 
Dan has horribly drowned her; the uncanny of the 
femme fatale is enacted by her terrifying rise from 
the watery depths, like the “one-note” monster she 
has been made to appear. If this conclusion seems to 
change femicide into a woman-on-woman murder, 
it is only, I suggest, because the audiences of Seattle, 
San Francisco, and Los Angeles felt compelled to 
forgive the male protagonist both his treachery and 
his violence, by displacing both characteristics onto 
his victim.
Princess Diana (1961-1997)
And what of the real-life case of Princess Diana? Let 
me begin by declaring that I am not going to suggest 
her early and sudden death was a case of femicide—
as defined and understood by this project—except 
in the eyes of the conspiracy theorists whose contri-
butions on the web (see: Wikipedia Diana conspira-
cy) constitute the main, lasting echo of those heady 
days of shock, almost twenty years ago. I want in-
stead to examine how she functioned as a femme fa-
tale, magnetizing the fantasies of those who adored 
and, arguably, sacrificed her. Some deaths are, of 
course, genuinely accidental. However, Diana in the 
Paris underpass, Alex in the bath, Marceline in an 
Algerian hotel, Carmen in the “lonely gorge,” and 
Manon in the Louisiana desert are perhaps less dif-
ferent than they appear on the surface. Each was 
brought to a place where something seemingly in-
evitable happened through a combination of cir-
cumstances in which blame circulates. 
Diana lived and died at the point of extreme visi-
bility and her death provoked, at least in the UK, 
a rare example of promiscuous grief played out in 
the same visible mode. What was the actual pro-
cess of her ability to represent in this way “the 
unusually multi-faceted reflector of a fragmented 
and fractious time” (Unsigned Editorial 1997:25)? 
I have argued elsewhere that the motif of radiance, 
ubiquitous in the media in the week after Diana’s 
death, can be connected structurally to her pre-
siding condition of bulimia. For both are circuits 
traced around, into and out of, the surface-point of 
the skin. It is not greed, in any normal sense, that 
motivates binge-eating, but the drive to circulate 
food without possessing it. Rather than consump-
tion, this seems to be a fascination with repeatedly 
rehearsing consumption without being its slave. 
The slavery of bulimia, unlike the different slavery 
of anorexia, is reproductive of itself; for this reason, 
if for no other, it is feminine. The bulimic of either 
sex is repeating the pattern that relegates women 
to reproductive, rather than productive work; but it 
is not work, in that it has no end-product; the body 
disguises its self-disgust in a “normalizing” tread-
mill of giving and taking.
Radiance, surprisingly perhaps, works in a very 
similar way. It too is a circular system in which 
what comes out has first been put in. Only our 
gaze makes her look radiant. She was, as Martin 
Amis (1997:53) put it, “a mirror, not a lamp.” Rilke 
(1965:4) describes this exactly in the second Duino 
Elegy, when he likens angels to mirrors that “draw 
their own streamed-forth beauty back into their 
own countenance.” No doubt, this was because, bi-
zarrely it seemed, the only person who did not love 
her was her husband: the large circuit of celebrity 
substituted for the ideal small circuit of intimacy.
If Diana seemed to present to us “the dazzling sur-
face of our accumulated desires” (Gerrard 1997:23), 
it is surely because she stood, in a very specific 
way, at the meeting-point of Foucault’s (1975) two 
representations of the relation of power to the gaze 
in Surveiller et punir (Discipline and Punish). Here, he 
describes the people looking up to the monarch: 
“Traditionally, power was what was seen, shown 
and manifested…Up to this point it had been the 
role of political ceremony to be the occasion for the 
excessive yet regulated manifestation of power” 
(Foucault 1975:219-220). At such moments, royalty 
was on display and the people were allowed to look, 
not on the face of power, certainly not into its eyes, 
but at a proper distance and logically from below. 
Genet’s (1956) Le Balcon (The Balcony) satirizes this 
relation of mass to icon when the denizens of his 
brothel present themselves as the Queen, the Judge, 
the Bishop, and the General, on the balcony that 
marks the liminal point between two worlds. The 
balcony and the media screen are such transmitting 
skins, dual-sided in their function of presenting and 
protecting. We gazed up and, by a certain distor-
tion (because she was actually taller than Prince 
Charles), we saw her gazing up too.
Diana, in fact, came to embody the dual verticality 
of power. Power is vertical, firstly, as we have just 
seen, because the few are on display to the many. 
Typically, in feudal regimes (of which the British 
monarchy is a late version, writ small), rituals and 
ceremonies ensured that those with power and 
privilege become known to their public by an “as-
cending” individualization. Over the last two cen-
turies, on the other hand, the downward gaze of 
a punitive surveillance or discipline individualizes 
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the common man or woman “by comparative mea-
sures referring to the ‘norm’ rather than by geneal-
ogies using ancestors as reference points; by ‘gaps’ 
rather than deeds” (Foucault 1975:226). 
It is in this sense that Princess Diana was, as end-
less accounts from all quarters marvel, “one of us.” 
And yet we also—as we discovered with contrition 
after she died—wanted to see her displayed, and 
thus wanted the discipline by which paparazzi pur-
sued her, hounded her out of doors and forced her 
indoors, with the threat of “face rape,” “hosing her 
down,” “whacking her,” or “blitzing her” (see: Alter 
1997:41; MacDonald 1997:18; the first term is Diana’s 
own, the others are photographers’). Diana was 
a double-facing skin between the feudal and mod-
ern modes of the exercise of power. This was most 
particularly her function for women. She could be 
adored, but also pitied, because whatever misfor-
tunes we think we have endured by virtue of our 
sex she seemed to have experienced, too. We looked 
simultaneously up and down, as she did. Our lives 
and fantasies (including our ambivalent longing to 
be gazed upon) were embodied in her. And, logical-
ly, we must have wished for her death at the hands 
of those who made her visible to us.
Thus, we reach the logical conclusion of the Diana 
phenomenon and the way in which we loved col-
lectively in the 1980s and 1990s, and perhaps still 
do. The immortality or virtuality of the object is 
already anticipated in life by the intense feelings 
generated by someone whom we do not know—and 
the underlying assumption that those who ought 
to love her will never do it as well as we do. This, 
my fifth example, seems to take the murderous atti-
tude of the femme fatale to its furthest distance from 
Othello or Carmen. Yet it also exemplifies the way 
in which the supposed love-object, glowing at first 
with charm and beauty, is finally wished dead by 
the very individual, or crowd, who cannot bear her 
strengths.
Conclusion
I hope I have shown how my literary cases exem-
plify a cultural phenomenon, demonstrating ver-
sions of femicide. In Manon Lescaut and Carmen, we 
have instances of the femme fatale whom the male 
protagonist blames for her own destruction. In 
L’Immoraliste, too, he can, he feels, only be strong if 
she is weakened to death—but, as in the first two 
texts, it turns out that her death deprives him of 
everything. These fictions disguise their femicid-
al motives in the poignancy of a young man’s life 
ultimately saved; yet this relies on the blaming of 
a victim guilty of not loving in exactly the way he 
wanted her to. In Alex Forrest, Dan discovers the 
power of desire and has to destroy it to recover his 
social and familial “virtue.” As for Diana, she was 
the object of a collective love based on the exposure 
of a failed intimacy and a seductive combination 
of glamour and humiliation. Unlike the literary 
texts, in which apparent circularity covers a dead-
ly unilateral impulse, her story was indeed one of 
circulation—her need, our need, her comfort, our 
comfort—turning upon the reflective screen of her 
skin. Her death is also a clear case of fatality—and 
yet, if it was a femicidal murder, the responsibility 
for it, like the modern-day version of love that it 
represents, cannot be located, it can only be mis-
located.
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